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594 PEISER v. METTLER [50 C.2d 
A. No. 24894. In Bank. July 11, 1958.] 
HENRIETTA M. PEISER et al., Appellants, v. WILLIE H. 
METTLER et al., Respondents. 
[1] Venue-Determination of Character of Action.-The nature of 
a cause of action so far as it affects or determines the place of 
trial will be ascertained from the complaint alone. 
[2] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-A cause of action for damages for 
breach of contract is transitory in character. 
[3] Landlord and Tenant--Assignment--Rights and Liabilities of 
Assignor.-Ordinarily, an assignment of a lease does not re-
lease the lessee from his obligation though the lessor consents 
to the assignment or the assignee expressly assumes obligations 
under the lease. 
[4] !d.-Assignment--Operation and Effect.-In a limited sense, an 
assignment of a lease makes the lessee a surety for the assignee 
as between the assignee and the lessee, but as between lessor 
and lessee the lessee remains a primary obligor under his ex-
press contract to pay rent. 
[5] !d.-Remedies of Landlord-Pleading-Parties.-Where an 
original lessee remains liable under the lease notwithstanding 
its assignment to others, he is a proper and necessary party to 
an action for damages for breach of the lease. 
[6] Venue-Change of Venue-Hearing.-On the hearing of a 
motion for change of venue by defendants residing outside 
the county in which the action is pending, the court should not 
try, on conflicting affidavits, the issues of fact going to the 
merits of the cause of action stated against a resident de-
fendant. 
[7] !d.-Change of Venue-Hearing.-On the hearing of a motion 
by defendants residing outside the county in which the action 
is pending for change of venue on the ground of improper 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Venue, §§ 5, 41; Am.Jur., Venue, § 8. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 222. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Venue, § 6; [2] Venue, § 26; [3] 
Landlord and Tenant,§ 189; [4] Landlord and Tenant,§ 183; [5] 
Landlord nnd Tenant, § 269; [6-8, 32] Venue, § 73; [9] Venue, ~ 8; 
[10, 11] Venue, ~ 7; [12] Actions, § 43; [13] Actions, § 2; [14] 
Landlord and Tenant, § 263; [15] Fixtures, § 11; [161 Fixtures, 
§ 18; [17] Venue, § 41; [18] Venut>, § 42; [19, 30, 31] Venue, 
§ 39(4); [20] Venue, § 64; [21] Venue, § 68; [22] Usages and 
Customs, § 15; [23, 241 Usages and Customs, § 2; [2'1-271 Lanrllord 
and Tenant, § 130; [28] Usages and Customs. ~ 9: [291 Words and 
Phrases; [33] Venue, § 68; [34] Venue, §§ 39(1), 39(4); [35] 
Venue, 39(1). 
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joinder of a defendant residing in the county, the real issue is 
whether plaintiff, in joining the resident defendant as a party, 
had reasonable ground for the belief in good faith that plain-
tiff had a cause of action against the resident defendant; 
if he did, it may not be said that the resident defendant was 
improperly joined as a defendant or was made a defendant 
solely for the purpose of having the action tried in the county 
of the resident defendant within the meaning of Code Civ. 
Proc., § 395. 
[8] !d.-Change of Venue-Hearing.-On the hearing of a motion 
for change of venue, the question of the transitory or local 
character of the causes of action must be determined from 
the allegations of the complaint on file at the time the motion 
was made and from the nature of the judgment which might 
be rendered thereon, assuming the truth of the allegations. 
[9a, 9b] Id.-Where Causes of Action Are Joined.-Where it ap-
pears, from a complaint joining causes of action for breach of 
contract (lease), conversion of eertain structures and improve-
ments, restoration and reinstallment of the same structures 
and improvements, and waste "if such property cannot be re-
stored," that the main relief sought in all causes of action is 
personal and that title to, or possession of, real property is 
only incidentally involved, it is error to grant defendants' mo-
tions for change of venue on the ground that the action is local 
and must be tried at the situs of the real property pursuant to 
Code Civ. Proc., § 392. 
[10] Id.-Where Causes of Action Are Joined.-When an action 
partly local and partly transitory is stated in separate causes 
of action, it is regarded as transitory in determining the place 
of trial. 
[11] Id.-Where Causes of Action Are Joined.-If there is a per-
sonal or in personam cause of action joined with one that is 
local in nature, defendant is entitled to have the proceeding 
transferred to the county of his residence; the action must 
be wholly local in nature to require it to be brought in the 
county of situs as designated in Code Civ. Proc., § 392, 
subd. (a). 
[12] Actions-Joinder of Causes of Action.-The seeking of dif-
ferent kinds of relief does not establish different causes of 
action. 
[13] !d.-Cause of Action.-A cause of action is based on the in-
jury to plaintiff, not the particular legal theory of defendant's 
wrongful act. 
[14] Landlord and Tenant-Remedies of Landlord.-Where plain-
tiffs set forth four causes of action but actually allege only one 
[9] See Cal.Jur., Venue, § 7. 
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namely, the removal of improvements from leased 
in violation of the terms of the lease, the different 
counts should not be considered as different causes of action 
but as alternative methods of pleading plaintiff's right of 
redress of the same wrong. 
[15] Fixtures-Effect of Severance.-The severance of fixtures and 
improvements from land changes the character of the property 
from real to personal, irrespective of the means by which it is 
accomplished. 
[16] !d.-Remedies.-Where a fixture annexed to a freehold is 
tortiously severed, the owner of the realty, at his option, may 
treat the fixture as personalty and recover it by an action of 
replevin. 
[17] Venue-Change of Venue-Several Defendants.-Even when 
all defendants join in a demand for or consent to a change of 
venue, the cause will be retained if the complaint attempts in 
t;pparent good faith to state a transitory cause of action 
against a defendant who resides in the county where the 
action is commenced. 
[18] !d.-Change of Venue-Several Defendants.-A plaintiff who 
has brought his action in the proper county will not be com-
pelled to go elsewhere merely because all defendants prefer 
it. 
[19] !d.-Change of Venue-Convenience of Witnesses.-Before 
the convenience of witnesses may be considered as a ground 
for an order granting a chang·e of venue it must be shown that 
their proposed testimony is admissible, relevant and material 
to some issue in the case as shown by the record before the 
court. 
[20] !d.-Change of Venue-Burden of Proof.-A party moving 
for change of venue for convenience of witnesses has the bur-
den of proving that both such convenience and the ends of 
justice will be promoted by the change. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 397, subd. 3.) 
[21] !d.-Change of Venue-Affidavits.-Affidavits in support of a 
motion for change of venue for convenience of witnesses must 
set forth the names of the witnesses, the nature of the testi-
mony expected from each, and the reasons why the attendance 
of each would be inconvenient. 
[22] Usages and Customs-Pleading.-Existence of a custom which 
is not so general that it will be presumed to have been known 
to the parties or of which a court will take judicial knowledge 
must be pleaded to warrant acceptance of evidence thereof. 
[23] !d.-Knowledge.-A person is not bound by a custom or usage 
unless he had actual knowledge thereof, or it is so general or 
well known in the community as to give rise to the presumption 
of knowledge. 
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[24] Id.-Knowledge.-Customs of special trades and local usages 
which are limited to certain communities are not presumed to 
be known to all persons; to bind one who is not engaged in the 
trade or occupation which employs the usage relied on, proof 
of his actual knowledge of the usage is necessary unless it is 
so commonly accepted that the public is presumed to recognize 
its existence. 
[25] Landlord and Tenant - Improvements - Disposition of Im-
provements at End of Term.-Under a lease providing that "all 
... improvements of a substantial or permanent character or 
that may be attached to the land, shall revert to and become 
the absolute property of Lessor," the term "improvement" is 
comprehensive enough to embrace all additions or alterations 
which may be made by a tenant for the convenience of his busi-
ness on the premises; it is more comprehensive than the word 
"fixtures," and while including these, includes also many 
things that may not be classed as fixtures. 
[26] !d.-Improvements-Disposition of Improvements at End of 
Term.-Where a lease provides that improvements made on the 
premises during the term of the lease shall inure to the lessor 
at the expiration of the term, the parties' intention, as ex-
pressed by their written agreement, rather than a custom in 
the county that the tenant could remove improvements plaeed 
on the land, is controlling. 
[27] !d.-Improvements-Disposition of Improvements at End of 
Term.-\Vhere a lease providing that improvements made on 
the premises shall inure to the lessor on termination of the 
lease specifically separates substantial or permanent improve-
ments from those that might be attached to the land, the 
movable character of any of the improvements is not a matter 
of controlling importance. 
[28] Usages and Customs-Contradicting Terms of Instrument.-
Where a lease specifically provides that improvements made 
on the premises shall inure to the lessor on termination of the 
lease, evidence of a custom in the county that the tenant could 
remove improvements placed on the land is inadmissible as 
tending to vary or contradict the terms of the lease agreement, 
and testimony concerning such custom is not material. 
[29] Words and Phrases-"Substantial."-The term "substantial" 
as it relates to the word "amount" imports a considerable 
amount of value in opposition to that which is inconsequential 
or small. 
[30a, 30b] Venue-Change of Venue-Convenience of Witnesses. 
-Where the pleadings alleged the value of improvements on 
leased premises to be substantial within the meaning of the 
lease agreement, but there was nothing in the record indicating 
that the witnesses to be produced were the only witnesses 
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who could testify to the value of the improvements because of 
their personal knowledge of the facts, the convenience of those 
witnesses should not be considered on a motion for change of 
venue. 
[31] Id.- Change of Venue- Convenience of Witnesses.-Gen-
erally, the convenience of experts should not be considered in 
determining the question of convenience of witnesses on appli-
cation for change of venue except where the experts have a 
personal knowledge of the facts on which their testimony is 
to be based. 
[32] !d.-Change of Venue-Hearing.-The value of improvements 
on leased premises is a question for the trier of fact on a trial 
of the case after hearing expert testimony or receiving stipula-
tion of the parties, and should not be considered on a motion 
for change of venue. 
[33] !d.-Change of Venue-Affidavits.-In an action against a 
lessee and assignees for breach of lease, conversion and waste 
arising from removal of "substantial" improvements from 
the leased premises, where witnesses' affidavits in support of 
a motion for change of venue on the ground of convenience 
of witnesses, did not state that their testimony would be that 
the improvements were not substantial within the meaning of 
the lease agreement, their testimony would not be material to 
the issues of the case as presented by the motion, and the affi-
davits were therefore improperly considered by the trial court. 
[34] !d.-Change of Venue-Convenience of Parties.-Convenience 
of the parties is not considered on a motion for change of 
venue, at least where an affidavit concerning the physical dis-
ability of one defendant does not aver that he would be called 
as a witness to give material evidence or state what his 
evidence would be. 
[35] !d.-Change of Venue-Convenience of Witnesses.-The fact 
that one defendant's books and records are located in a county 
other than the one in which the action is pending, or that the 
court calendar in the county first mentioned is less congested 
than that in the other, does not warrant a change of venue for 
convenience of witnesses. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting change of venue. Aubrey N. Irwin, 
Judge. Reversed. 
J_,ivingston & Borregard, Lawrence Livingston, Leo E. 
Borregard and Isabella H. Grant for Appellants. 
Vizzard, Baker & Sullivan, J\'Iaas & Nairn and Donahue & 
Goldberg for Respondents. 
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CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs appeal from an order granting de-
fendants' motions for a change of venue from J_,os Angeles 
County to Kern County. TlHe motious were made and granted 
on the grounds of (1) residence of defendants; (2) that the 
action involved damage or injury to real property situated in 
Kern County; and because of eonvenience of witne<;ses. 
'l'he eomplaint alleges that the controversy here involved 
grew out of a written lease agreement involving land situated 
in Kern County. Plaintiffs are the original lessors, or their 
successors; defendant Mettler was the original lessee. De-
fendant Mettler assigned the lease to defendants Fry who 
sublet the easterly one-half of the premises to defendant 
Garner who subsequently sublet part of his interest to de-
fendant Moore. 'l'he lease was executed and recorded in 1945. 
Under the terms of the lease the lessee was given the option 
to extend the term thereof for a five-year period. The option 
was exercised by defendants Fry as ·will hereinafter appear. 
The lease which is made part of the complaint provides: 
"4. That Lessee shall drill and complete two (2) wells to 
irrigate said land in the proper cultivation and farming there-
of; that Lessee shall construct and lay at least two (2) milt>s 
of fourteen (14) inch concrete irrigation pipeline and install 
pumps for such irrigation purposes; that the aforesaid con-
struction and installation of pumps, pipeline and any and all 
other improvements that may be made by Lessee shall be at 
the sole cost and expense of Lessee. 
"5. That upon the t>xpiration or soo1wr or other termi-
nation of this lease all of said pipt>line and pumps so built and 
installed as aforesaid, and all otlwr improvements of a sub-
stantial or permanent character, or that ma:v be attached to 
the land, shall revert to and become the absolute property of 
Lessor, free and clear of an:v and all claims against the same." 
The lease then continued as follows: 
"11. That in the event Lessee desires to extend the term 
of this lease for an additional :five ( 5) years from date of ex-
piration hereof the option herein granted for such extension 
must be exercised by said Lessee by written notice to r~essor of 
Lessee's intention so to do not less than three ( 3) months 
before the date of expiration." 
"13. In thr event Lessee assigns or subleases an:v of the 
leased land in whole or in part, r~essee Rhall rrmain responsible 
and liable for the performance of all obligations herein con-
tained, unless consent of Lessor is obtained in writing, to 
assign or sublease." 
600 PEISER v. 1VIETTLER [50 C.2d 
"17. That this lease and all the terms, covenants and con-
ditions herein contained, subject to the provisions as to assign-
ments, shall apply to and bind the heirs, executors, adminis-
trators and assigns of the parties hereto." 
In 1947, 1\Iettler, the original lessee, assigned the lease to 
defendants who agreed that they would "well and truly 
keep and perform each and every covenant and condition in 
said lease original lease agre0ment] provided to be per-
fornwd by the lessee and will hold the assignor he1·ein free 
and blamE'less from payment of said rentals and performance 
of sairl covenants and conditions." 
In 1949. defendants Fry sublet, subject to the" Assignment 
of r~ease," to defendant Garner the easterly one-half of the 
property. In l 950, defendants Fry gave written notice to 
plaintiffs that they intended to exercise the option to extend 
the lease for a five-year period. Drfendant Mettler did not 
obtain written consent from the original lessors for the assign-
ment to d0fendants Fry. 
At various times subsequent to the execution of the original 
lease defendants installed in or built upon the leased premises: 
"1. A pipe line more than two (2) miles in length and ap-
proximately 14" in diameter was built and installed in the 
land. 2. Three (3) deep wells were drilled and constructed 
to connect with said pipe line as integral part of the irrigation 
system of said property. 3. As appurtenances to said wells 
there were attachf'd thereto shafts, boles, pumps, motors and 
pipelines, all of which were integral parts of the irrigation 
system of said property. 4. There were also installed and 
attached to pipelines three (3) sumps, together with thf'ir 
appurtenances, including three (3) tail-water pumps, motors 
and pipe lines, all of which were also integral parts of said 
irrigation system. 5. There were built upon said property 
two (2) oue-story dwelling houses, one (1) duplex dwelling 
house, one (1) general utility building, one (1) two-car 
garage, one (1) shed and additional structures, the exact 
nature and character of which are unknown to plaintiffs 
and are well known to defendants." 
Plaintiffs allege that defendants, or some of them. brearhed 
tl1e terms of the le11se by removing from the premises one 
deep well shaft, bole, pipeline, motor and pump; two tail-
water pumps and motors and pipelines attached; two dwelling 
houses; one duplex dwelling; one general utility building; 
one shed; and the other buildings heretofore described to 
their damage in the sum of $31,275.20. The complaint sets 
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forth four "causes of action": (1) breach of contract; (2) 
damages for conversion of the structures and improvements; 
(3) restoration and redelivery of the removed property to-
gether with damages resulting from the cost of reinstallation 
and for loss of use; and one for waste to the real property 
arising from the removal of the heretofore described property. 
Defendant Mettler, defendants Fry and defendants Garner 
and Moore filed three separate answers. At the same time 
all defendants filed separate motions for change of venue (the 
grounds of which have been heretofore set forth) from Los 
Angeles to Kern County. The affidavits in support thereof, 
which plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved to strike, will be con-
sidered subsequently. 
Plaintiffs concede that if any of the three grounds upon 
which the trial court granted defendants' motions for change 
of venue can be supported the order should be affirmed. 
RESIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS 
Defendant Mettler by affidavit admits that he is a resident 
of Los Angeles County. The other defendants are residents 
of Kern County. It is defendants' argument that defendant 
Mettler was joined only for the purpose of securing venue in 
Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain 
that Mettler is a proper and necessary party. Therefore, 
the first question that presents itself is whether the complaint 
states a cause of action against defendant Mettler. [1] "The 
nature of the cause of action so far as it affects or determines 
the place of trial will be ascertained from the complaint alone, 
and the court will inspect the complaint for the purpose of 
determining the character of the action and the judg-ment 
which may be rendered." (Sam Fin man, Inc. v. Rokuz li old-
ing Corp., 130 Cal.App.2d 758, 759-760 [27!) P.2d 982].) We 
held in Kaluzok v. Brisson, 27 Cal.2d 760, 762 [167 P.2d 481, 
163 A.L.R. 1308], that "To decide the question [as to whether 
a defendant was entitled to a change of venue] it is necessary 
to determine the nature of the action as disclosed by the 
complaint, and the scope of the judgment which mig-ht be 
Pntered on default ( N ect v. JI olmcs, 19 Cal.2d 605 r] 22 p .2d 
557] ; EcksfTancl v. Wnslwsen, 217 CaL 380 [18 P.2d 931]; 
GTorcrs' Fruit Growing Union v. Kern County Lwncl Co., 
150 Cal. 466 f89 P. 1201; McFarland v. Mart?:n, 144 Cal. 771 
[78 P. 239])." [2] Plaintiffs' fin:t cause of action is for 
damages for breach of contract which is clearly a transitory 
cause of action. In the Kaluzok case, S1lpra, the action was one 
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for damages for fraudulent representations made by the 
sellers of real property in order to induce the plaintiffs to buy 
land. In holding that the action was a transitory one, we 
said that the ''gravamen of the present action is damages for 
deceit" and that the "title to the real property would not be 
affected. 'l'hat title remains in the plaintiffs as before, encum-
bered by the same deed of trust given to seeure whatever 
sum the plaintiffs arc in law obligated to pay the defendants. 
No interest in the real property is determined or affected." 
(Kaluzok v. Brisson, 27 Cal.2(1 760, 763, 764 [167 P.2d 481, 
163 A.L.R. 1308}.) 
It will be recalled that under the terms of the lease agree-
ment defendant Mettler remained liable to the lessors on the 
lease even though he assignetl it unless he obtained the written 
consent of the lessors. No such written consent was obtained. 
Mettler's assignees took with notice of the terms and provi-
sions of the lease and subject thereto. The complaint alleged 
a breach of the terms of the lease by defendant Mettler and/or 
the defendant assignees. [3] However, as we held in De-
Hart v. Allen, 26 Cal.2d 829, 832 [161 P.2d 453], "Ordinarily 
an assignment of a lease does not release the lessee from his 
obligations even though the lessor consents to the assignment. 
(Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 212 [146 P. 638, Ann.Cas. 
1916E 830].) Nor does the express assumption by the 
assignee of obligations under the lease affect the liability of 
the lessee to the lessor. (Lopizich v. Salter, 45 Cal.App. 446, 
449 [187 P. 1075]; 32 Am .• Jur. 315.) [4] It has sometimes 
been said that the effect of an assignment i8 to make the lessee 
a surety for the assignee. (Sarnu.els v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 
212 [146 P. 638, Ann.Cas. 1916E 830] ; Brosnan v. Kramer, 
135 Cal. 36, 39 [66 P. 979] ; Schehr v. Berkey, 166 Cal. 157, 
160 [135 P. 41].) This may be true in a limited sense as 
between the assignee and his assignor, the lessee, but as be-
tween the lessor and the lessee the latter remains a primary 
obligor under his expre:ss contract to pay rent. (T.A.D. Jones 
Co. v. Winchestet· Repeating Arms Co., 55 F.2d 944, 61 F.2d 
774, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 609 [53 S.Ct. 401, 77 L.Ed. 983] ; 
Tiffany on Landlord and 'I'enant, vol. 1, p. 994; 32 Am.Jur. 
310-311, 321.)" [5] It is obvious from the above cited rule 
that defendant Mettler remained liable under the lease and 
was, therefore, a proper and necessary party to the action 
and that the complaint states a cause of action as to him. 
(Russello v. Mori, 153 Cal.App.2d 828 [315 P.2d 343]; Taff v. 
Goodman, 41 Cal.App.2d 771, 776 [107 P.2d 431] .) In Cali-
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fornia Collection Agency v. Fontana, 61 Cal.App.2d 648, 653 
[143 P.2d 507], an order granting a motion for a change of 
venue was reversed. [6] The court there said : "It also 
appears clear from the language of the decisions that upon 
the hearing of such motion, the court should not try, upon 
conflicting affidavits, the issues of fact going to the merits 
of the cause of action stated against the resident defendant. 
(Pacific Coast Auto. Assn. v. Ahlf., 115 Cal.App. 21, 24 [300 
P. 841]; Sourbis v. Rhoads, 50 Cal.App. 98, 101 [194 P. 521); 
~Mitchell v. Kim, 42 Cal.App. 111, 114 [183 P. 368]; Lake-
shore C. Co. v. Modoc L. & L. Co., 108 Cal. 261, 262 f 41 P. 
472]; McKenzie v. Barling, 101 Cal. 459, 462 [36 P. 8].) 
[7] In our opinion the rule, supported by reason and by 
authority, is that upon the hearing of the motion for change 
of venue under the circumstancrs presented herr, the rral 
issue for determination by the trial court was whether plain-
tiff, in joining the resident defendant as a party, had rrason-
able grounds for the belief in good faith that plaintiff had a 
cause of action against the resident defendant. If he did, then 
we do not believe that it may be said that the resident defend-
ant was improperly joined as a defendant or was made a 
defendant solely for the purpose of having the action tried 
in the county of the residence of the reBident defendant within 
the meaning of section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 
(McClung v. Watt, 190 Cal. 155 r21l P. 17]; Freeman V. 
Dowl,ing, 219 Cal. 213 [25 P.2d 980] ; Gntfesfcld v. Richma£d 
Ice Cream Co., 115 Cal.App.2d 854 [252 P.2d 973].) It 
follows, from the foregoing, that the trial court erred in 
granting defrndants' motion for a change of venue on the 
ground of defendants' residence. 
LOCAL OR TRANSITORY NATURE OF THE CASE 
[8] The question of the transitory or local character of 
the causes of action must be determined from the allegations 
of the complaint on file at the time the motion waB madt> and 
from the nature of the judgment which might be rendered 
thereon, assuming the truth of the allegations. (N eet Y. 
Holmes, 19 CaL2d 605, 607 [122 P.2d 557]; Sheeley v. Jones, 
192 Cal. 256 [219 P. 744]; Eckstmnd v. Wilslmscn, 217 Cal. 
380 [18 P.2d 931]; Sausen v. Anderton, 129 Cal.App.2d 324 
[276 P.2d 814]; Bybee v. Fairch£ld, 75 Cal.App.2d 35 [170 
P.2d 54].) 
In the case under consideration, plaintiffs' complaint con-
tained four so-called causes of action: breach of contract; 
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conversion of certain sirnci nn•s and improvenwnts; n•"tora-
tion and reinRtallmcnt of the same structures mH1 improve-
ments; and a cause of action for waste ''if such propr,rt:v 
eannot be restored.'' Plaintiffs prayed for damages for breach 
of contrad, together with attorneys' for the first two 
causes of ar:tion for the retnrn of ilw clcscribe<1 improvements 
together vvith damages for reinstallation and los~ of nse on the 
third eause of aetion; or. in the for 
loss of use and the value of the improvemrnts in the eve11t the 
improvements eonld not be restored; for damag,•s in the 
amount of the value of the improvr'ments and for trebled 
damages in the cause of action for waste. 
[9a] It would appear from the allegations and prayer of 
the eomplaint that the main relief songht in all four causes 
of aetion was personal and that title to, or possession of, real 
property was only ineillentalJy involved. As we held in N eet 
v. Holmes, E) Cal.2d 606, 611-612 [122 P.2d 357], "'fhe nature 
of the action here is Cflflentially transitory, that is, the defend-
ants would be entitled to have it tried in the eounty of: their 
resid('nce, if the determination of an estate or iutcrrst in land 
is merely ineidental to the determination of a cause for equita-
ble relief in trust, frand, or contraet. 'l'hc nahu·e of the action 
is local, and must be tried in the county >\'here the land is 
situated, where it turns on the title to property as distinct 
from the pprsonal obligation, and the decree operates ex 
propTio vigore 011 the title. (Stair v. RolfCtl Consolidated 
Mining Co., 187 Cal. 34:3, 851 [202 P. 18:3].) In Booker v. 
Aitken, 140 Cal. 471 [74 P. 11], an aetion to recover real 
property on the ground that a deed of said prorwrty was 
invalid for fraud, was deemed to be local and an order deny-
ing a motion for a change of venue to the county of the 
defendant's resicleHcn was aftlrmed. The prineiples herein-
above stated were reeognLoed and it was expressly pointed out 
that in that case neitlwr a personal aceouuting nor a money 
judgment was sought, and that the substantial and only spe-
cific appropriate n•lief rela1ed to the title of the land drcued 
to the defendant. Similar cases are Eckstrand v. VVilslmscn, 
217 Cal. 380 [18 P.2(1 931] and State v. Royal Consol1:datcd 
Mining Co., supra. 
"In the present case it is obvious that the action turns 
principally on the personal obligation, as distinet from the 
title, and that judgment for any mining propertiPs not now 
owned by the plaintiffs would follow if at all, nwrely as an 
incident of the judgment establishing the personal obligation." 
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[10] In Rosen v. Kessler, 145 Cal.App.2d 676, 683 [303 
P.2d 110], the court held: "Under the general rule, when 
an action is partly local and partly transitory and stated in 
separate causes of action, it is to be regarded as transitory in 
determining the place of trial.'' (See also II enderson v. 
Henderson, 85 Cal.App.2d 476 [193 P.2d 135].) 
[11] In Hardy v. White, 130 Cal.App.2d 550, 552 [279 
P.2d 126], the court said: The well settled rule is that if 
there is a personal, or ·in personam, cause of action joined with 
one that is local in nature, the defendant is entitled to have 
the proceeding transferred to the county of his residence. 
The action must be wholly local in nature to require ·it to be 
brought in the county of the situs as designated in section 
392, subdivision (a), Code of Civil Procedure. (Turlock 
Theatre Co. v. Laws, 12 Cal.2d 573, 576 [86 P.2d 345, 120 
A.L.R. 786] ; see California cases collected in 120 A.L.R. 791-
792.) '' (Emphasis added.) 
\Vhile the case at bar could be considered to come within 
the rules just set forth, it appears to us that the complaint 
sets forth only one cause of action stated on four different 
legal theories even though the theories are called separate 
''causes of action.'' The entire transaction arose out of the 
alleged breach of the lease agreement by defendant Mettler, 
the original lessee, and his assignees and the sublessees. The 
so-called fourth cause of action for waste is also predicated 
on the lease agreement in that the lease provides, and plaintiffs 
so allege, that "lessee shall not commit any waste or damage, or 
suffer any to be done .... " [12] It was held in California 
Trust Co. v. Cohn, 214 Cal. 619, 629 [7 P.2d 297], that "The 
seeking of different kinds of relief does not establish different 
causes of action." (Security Loan etc. Co. v. Mattern, 131 
Cal. 326 [63 P. 482] .) [13] 'l'he cause of action is based 
upon the injury to the plaintiff and not the particular legal 
theory of the defendant's wrongful act (Panos v. Great West-
ern Packing Co., 21 Cal.2d 636 (134 P.2d 242] ; Steiner v. 
'Thomas, 94 Cal.App.2d 655 [211 P.2d 321]). [14] In the 
ease under consideration, plaintiffs have alleged but one wrong 
-the removal of the improvements heretofore described in 
violation of the terms of the lease. In an analogous situation 
in a change of venue case the court, in Maselli v. E. H. Appleby 
& Co., Inc., 117 Cal.App.2d 634, 636, 637 [256 P.2d 618], 
said : "It is obvious from the allegations of all three counts 
contained in the complaint that the common counts are not 
based on separate contracts and that there was in fact only 
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one transaction out of which this suit arose. Although our 
case law permits the use of common counts, nevertheless the 
courts recognize that where the common counts follow a count 
wherein all of the facts on which plaintiff's demand is based 
are specifically pleaded and the common counts upon their face 
make it clear that they are based upon the same set of facts, 
the common counts are to be considered not as different causes 
of action, but as alternative methods of pleading the plaintiff's 
right to recover the money judgnient he seeks." 
[15] There is no merit to defendants' argument that the 
''causes of action'' for conversion and replevin involve ''real 
property." The severance of the fixtures and improvements 
from the land ''changed the character of the property from 
real to personal, irrespective of the means by which it was 
accomplished." (Buckmd v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433, 436 [87 Am. 
Dec. 90] .) [16] In Teater v. Good Hope Dev. Corp., 14 
Cal. 2d 196, 208 [93 P.2d 112], we held that " ... Where a 
fixture annexed to a freehold is tortiously severed, the owner 
of the realty, at his option, may treat the fixture as personalty 
and recover the same by the action of replevin .... '' (22 
Cal.Jur.2d, § 38, pp. 324, 325.) 
[9b] Whether we consider that there has been a joinder 
of transitory causes of action with a local action and that 
the transitory actions control so far as venue is concerned, 
or whether we consider that plaintiffs have stated only one 
transitory cause of action, the result is the same under the 
rules and authorities heretofore set forth and the trial court 
was in error in granting the defendants' motions for change 
of venue on the ground that the action was a local one which 
must be tried at the situs of the real property pursuant to 
the provisions of section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The fact that defendant Mettler joined with the other de-
fendants in moving for a change of venue is immaterial. 
[17] As we said in Monogram Co. v. Kingsley, 38 Cal.2d 
28, 30 [237 P.2d 265], "Even when all of the defendants join 
in a demand for or consent to a change of venue the cause 
will be retained if the complaint attempts in apparent good 
faith to state a cause of action against a defendant who resides 
in the county where the action was commenced. . . . [18] [A l 
plaintiff who has brought this action in the proper county will 
not be compelled to go elsewhere merely because all of the 
defendants prefer it." (Independent Iron Works v. American 
Pres. Lines, Ltd., 35 Cal.2d 858 [221 P.2d 939] .) 
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[19] Before the convenience of witnesses may be con-
sidered as a ground for an order granting a elJange of venue 
it mnst be shown that their proposed testimony is admissible, 
relevant and material to some issue in the case as shown by 
the record before the court (JJ1iller & Lux v. Kern County 
Land Co., 140 Cal. 132, 138 [73 P. 836]; Wong F'ung Hing 
v. San Francisco etc. Funds, 15 CaLApp. 537 [115 P. 331] ; 
Mize v. Old Taylor Fruit Co., 114 Cal.App. 588 [300 P. 128] ; 
If arden v. Skinnet· & Hammond, 130 Cal.App.2d 750 [279 P.2d 
978]). 
Plaintiffs concede that the witnesses whose convenience is 
to be considered are residents of Kern County. 
[20] Section 397, subdivision 3, of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that the court may, on motion change the 
place of trial "'\Vhen the convenience of witnesses and the 
ends of justice would be promoted by the change." In 
Willingham v. Pecora, 44 Cal.App.2d 289, 295 [112 P.2d 328], 
it was held that both of the eonditions--convenience of wit-
nesses and the ends of justice-must occur and that the moving 
party has the burden of proving that both conditions will be 
met. 
[21] The affidavits in support of the motion for change 
of venue on this ground must set forth the names of the 
witnesses, the nature of the testimony expectrd from each, 
and the reasons why the attendancr of each would be incon-
vrnient. (Juneatl v. J1cnea11, 45 Cal.App.2d 14 [113 P.2d 
463] ; San Jose 11 ospital v. Etherton, 84 Cal.App. 516 r258 
P. 611]; Harden v. Skinner & Hammond, 130 Ca1.App.2d 750, 
755 [279 P.2d 978] .) 
Some 20 affidavits were filed in support of the motions 
for change of venue. The witnesses' (as distinguished from 
the parties' and attornrys') affidavits were devoted, pri-
marily, to averments that there was a custom and usage in 
Kern County that buildings such as those hrre involved, 
pumps, motors, tail water pumps, etc., were considrred per-
sonalty which were removable by the lessee dnring, or at the 
end of the term. Othrr afiidavits were concrnwd with the value 
of the improvements and the mannrr of thrir attachnwnt to 
the real property. 
Plaintiffs contend that their motion to strike thr affidavits 
should have been grantrd; that the evidence as to custom and 
usage was inadmissible, immaterial and irrelevant because 
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( 1) it was not pleaded by the defendants; it was not 
shown that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the pur-
ported custom and usage ; ( 3) that the purported custom and 
usage would vary and contradict the terms of the lease-not 
interpret it; and ( 4) that the testimony relating to the pur-
ported custom and usage was to be given by expert witnesses 
whose convenience is not to be considered. 
Defendants concede that custom and usage was not pleaded 
by them. [22] In Tharp v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 27 
Cal.App.2d 554, 561 [81 P.2d 443, 82 P.2d 21], it was held 
that ''it is the invariable rule that evidence of a custom which 
is not so general in its character that it will be presumed to 
have been known to the parties or of which a court will take 
judicial knowledge must be pleaded to warrant the accept-
ance of evidence of such custom .... The appellant failed to 
plead the custom, the proof of which he sought to introduce." 
(Pray v. Trower Lumber Co., 101 Cal.App. 482 [281 P. 
1036].) There is nothing in the record to show that plaintiffs 
knew, or should have known, of the purported custom and 
usage and defendants' only argument on this point is that 
plaintiffs were lessors of farm land located in Kern County. 
As the court said in Mize v. Old Taylor Fruit Co., 114 Cal. 
App. 588, 590 [300 P. 128], "the affidavit in support of the 
motion fails to supply this necessary link connecting the testi-
mony of the inconvenienced witnesses with the issues in the 
case." [23] And, as was held, in Roberts Distrib. Co. v. 
Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126 Cal.App.2d 664, 676 [272 P.2d 886], 
''A person is not bound by a custom or usage unless he had 
actual knowledge thereof, or it is so general or well-known in 
the community as to give rise to the presumption of such 
knowledge." [24] In Miller v. Stults, 143 Ca1.App.2d 592, 
602 [300 P.2d 312], it was said: " ' ... Customs of special 
trades and local usages which are limited to certain com-
munities are not presumed to be known to all persons. (Jones 
on Evidence, 3d ed., p. 714, § 464.) To bind one who is not 
engaged in the trade or occupation which employs the usage 
relied upon, proof of his actual knowledge of the usage is 
necessary, unless it is so commonly accepted that the public is 
presumed to recognize its existence. . . . ' 
'' ... So in the case at bar it does not appear that either 
party manifested an intention to be governed by the asserted 
custom .... 'l'here was no evidence that defendant was a 
farmer. [Citation.] So far as the record shows, defendant 
was a stranger to farming customs.'' In the case at bar there 
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is nothing to show that plaintiffs, or any of them, were farmers 
or that they knew anything of farming customs. 
Defendants argue that the purported custom and usage is 
admissible to interpret the terms of the lease agreement rather 
than to vary or contradict them. It will be recalled that the 
lease provided that "upon the expiration or sooner or other 
termination of this lease all of said pipe line and pumps so 
built and installed as aforesaid, and all other improvements of 
a substantial or permanent character or that rnay be attached 
to the land, shall revert to and become the absolute property 
of Lessor, free and clear of any and all claims against the 
same." (Emphasis added.) It will be noted that the pro-
vision refers to improvements of a substantial or permanent 
character or those attached to the land. [25] In Realty Dock 
etc. Corp. v. Anderson, 174 Cal. 672, 676-677 [164 P. 4], we 
held that "It is, of course, quite apparent that the term 'im-
provement' is comprehensive enough to embrace all additions 
or alterations whieh may be made by a tenant for the con-
venience of his business upon the premises. It is much more 
comprehensive than the word 'fixture,' and while including 
these, includes also many things that may not be classed as 
fixtures. In fact, if force is to be given to a provision in a 
lease which provides that all 'improvements' made in prem-
ises shall inure to the lessor, it is difficult to conceive of any 
subsequent addition, alteration, or repair to the premises 
during the tenancy which would not be embraced within the 
term 'improvement.' " We also held, in answer to the argu-
ment made by the lessee that the property was movable that 
"It is not a matter of controlling importance whether the 
vault as constructed was a permanent or a movable fixture. 
We are not here considering the rights arising by operation of 
law only between landlord and tenant as to the articles placed 
upon the leased premises by the latter. On the contrary, these 
rights are to be determined from the terms of the lease under 
which the parties undertook to fix them." [26] Defendants' 
contention that the custom and usage in Kern County was that 
the tenant could remove improvements placed upon the land 
is directly opposed to the terms of the lease which provides 
that all such improvements shall remain on the land and be-
come the absolute property of the lessor. The parties' in-
tention, as expressed by their written agreement, is controlling 
and, under their agreement "reasonable minds cannot but 
agree" that the improvements here involved were covered by 
50 C.2d-20 
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the of ihe lease heretofore (1Vilmerton v. 
lYlorton, 7·1 Cal.App.2d 891, 896 [1 69 P .2d ) . [27] 'l'he 
lease here speei:fiea1ly separated substantial or permanent im-
provements from thoRe that might be aUaehrr1 to the land so 
the movable character of any of the improvements under con-
sideration is not a matter of "c-ontrolling importance." In 
Allen v. Alberts, 82 Cal.App.2d 1:!, 16 [185 I'.2cl , where 
the lease proYided that all furniture, furnishings, equipment 
or fixtures installed on the premises, or to he in;;ta1led, shonld 
become the property of the lessor upon trrmination ol' the 
lease, the eourt said in answer to an attempt by the Jessee 
to introduce cvidenc•e of eustom and usage to the contrary: 
'"rbis propositiou is likewise without merit. The lease herein 
involved specifically provided that all persollal property and 
furnishings installed in the premises should be a part of the 
lease property and 1wlong to th(~ lessors. HPnee there was no 
necessity for introducing any evidence as to custom and usage 
:;;inee the agreement involvrd ~wac; sreeifil~ and lnlam biguous." 
(Sharpe v. Arabian Limaican Oil Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 99 [244 
P.2d 83]; Dca v. Davy, 150 Cal.App.2d 4:15 [309 P.2d 8!14]; 
Miller v. Stu Us, 143 Cal.App.2d 592 [800 P.2d 312] .) [28] It 
clearly appears that eviden(:C relative to the purported cus-
tom and usage would tend to vary or eontradiet the terms of 
the lt•ase agreement and is therefore inadmissible and the wit-
nesses' testimony eonrcrning it is therefore not material. 
Defendants' next argnr)l(mt is that "there still remains a 
serious question of interpretation as to just what property is 
substantial.'' Some of the prospective 1vitnesses whose r~on­
vcnienee is being eonsiden~d were to testify to the Yalne of the 
improvements. \Vhile the parties disagree, as is seen from the 
complaint and answers thereto, as to the value of the im-
provements, it ~would appear that in either event the value 
is substantial as distingniRhcd from ineonse(]uential. [29] In 
In re Scroggin, 103 Cal.App.2d 281, 283 [229 P.2d 4801, the 
court was considering the word "substantial" as it related to 
the word "amount." It vvas there held that the word "sub~ 
stantial" "imports a considerable amount of value in opposi-
tion to that whieh is ineonst>qnential or small." Defendants 
do not deny that the value of the improvement,; is substantial. 
Plaintiffs and defendants agree that expert witnesses with a 
per;;;onal knowledge of the faets of the partienlar case come 
>vithin the rule that permits their c-onvenience to he con-
sidered (Figley v. Cal'ifornia <1rrow Airlines, 111 Cal.App.2d 
285 [244 P.2d 472]) but they disagree as to the materiality 
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of the testimony so far as this particular case is concerned. 
[30a] In other words, plaintiffs argue that any appraiser 
can give the same testimony without examining the property 
and that the convenience of these witnesses should not be con-
sidered under the general rule. We agree with plaintiffs. 
T·he pleadings allege the value of the improvements to be sub-
stantial within the meaning of the lease agreement. There is 
nothing in the record to show that these witnesses are the only 
witnesses who could testify to the value of the improvements 
because of their personal knowledge of the facts of the case. 
In the Figley case experts had examined the scene of an 
airplane accident and were to give testimony as to their 
opinion of the causes of the crash. [31] The court in affirm-
ing an order denying a change of venue said that ''Generally, 
the convenience of experts should not be considered in deter-
mining the question of convenience of witnesses on application 
for change of venue except where the experts have a personal 
knowledge of the facts upon which their testimony is to be 
based. (Security Investrnent Co. v. Gifford, 179 Cal. 277 
[176 P. 444).) 
''In this case, as we have commented, the court might 
well have considered that what one of these men knew it 
would be reasonable to suppose all knew, and hence the ex-
ception to the rule above stated, based upon personal knowl-
edge of the experts, would have no application." (Pp. 287, 
288.) [30b] In the case under consideration, affiants Cassady 
and Gargan had made appraisals of the improvements moved 
from the property. It appears from the affidavits that the 
property can be located and it does not appear that any other 
appraiser could not make the same inspection or that the 
witnesses would testify that the improvements were not suh-
stantial within the meaning of the lease agreement. It does 
not appear, therefore, that the convenience of these expert wit-
nesses should be considered on the motion for change of venue. 
[32] The matter of the value of the improvements is a 
question for the trier of fact upon a trial of the case after 
hearing expert testimony or receiving stipulation of the parties 
and should not be considered upon a motion for a change of 
venue. In Security Investment Co. v. Gifford, 179 Cal. 277 
[176 P. 444]; Barnett v. United Oil Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 175 
[42 P.2d 656]; W1·in v. Ohlandf, 213 Cal. 158 [1 P.2d 991]; 
and Pacific Coast etc. Ins. Co. v. Land Title Ins. Co., 97 Cal. 
App.2d 829 [218 P.2d 573], it was held that the convenience 
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of expert witnesses such as we have here could not be con-
sidered on a motion for a change of venue. 
[33] Inasmuch as the witnesses' affidavits do not purport 
to state that their testimony would be that the improvements 
were not substantial within the meaning of the lease agreement 
their testimony would not be material to the issues of the 
case as presented on the motions for change of venue and 
the affidavits were, therefore, improperly considered by the 
trial court. 
[34] \Vith reference to the other affidavits, convenience of 
the parties is not to be considered upon a motion for a change 
of venue ( W rin v. Ohlandt, 213 Cal. 158 [1 P.2d 991]) and 
the case does not fall within the rule of Simonian v. Simonian, 
97 Cal.App.2d 68, 69 [217 P.2d 157], where it was held that 
a party's physical condition made it impossible for him to 
travel to a distant county to give "material evidence." The 
affidavit concerning the physieal disability of the senior de-
fendant Fry did not aver that he would be ealled as a witness 
to give "material evidenee" or state what his evidenee would 
be. On the contrary, it appears that the younger defendant 
Fry bad, for some time, been in charge of the Fry affairs. 
[35] There is no merit to defendants' argument that defend-
ant Mettler's books and records were located in Kern County 
(Neet v. Holmes, 19 Cal.2d 605, 613, 614 (122 P.2d 557]) 
and that the court calendar in Kern County is less congested 
than tl1at in l;os Angeles County inasmueh as neither of these 
reasons falls within the statutory provision regarding change 
of venue for convenience of witnesses. 
Because the record does not show that the prospective wit-
nesses whose convenience was under consideration would 
testify to facts within their knowledge material to the issues of 
the ease as distinguished from expert opinion evidence of 
value, the trial court erroneously granted the motions for a 
change of venue on this ground. 
There being no support in the record for the order granting 
defendants' motions for a change of venue, the order must be 
and is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
McComb, J., dissented. 
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